xtendhealthcare.net security report

Certificate, security headers, email authentication, DNS, registration, and exposed hosts — from public sources.

38risk

Moderate

Some surface to tighten, nothing urgent.

0Critical

0High

3Medium

10Low

2Info

Collected 12 hours ago2.2sfrom cache

Certificate Transparency34
DNS resolution18
Network ownership0
CDN / WAF detection0
Exposed ports & CVEs2
Registration
DNS posture2
Email authentication2
Certificate
Security headers2
Archived URLs
Analysis15

noteFound 34 hostnames; this runtime allows 50 outbound requests per scan, so the 21 most likely to matter were resolved.
noteCertificate inspection is unavailable in this runtime.
noteNetwork ownership lookup is unavailable in this runtime; ASN and org are omitted.
noteCDN/WAF detection is unavailable in this runtime.

Without HSTS the browser will still try http:// first on a fresh visit, which is the window an on-path attacker uses.
What to do
Send `Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains` once you are sure everything works over HTTPS.
asset: https://xtendhealthcare.net/
CSP is the main defence that limits what an injected script can do. Without it, any XSS bug is fully exploitable.
What to do
Start with a report-only policy, tighten it against the reports, then enforce.
asset: https://xtendhealthcare.net/
Without clientTransferProhibited, a compromised registrar account can move the domain to another registrar in days, with no second step.
What to do
Enable the transfer lock (and registrar lock, if offered) in the registrar control panel.
asset: xtendhealthcare.net
209.17.116.163 (xtendhealthcare.net) reports lua-nginx-module 1.27.1.2, lua-nginx-module 1.25.3.1, openresty 1.27.1.2. Publishing precise versions lets anyone match the host against a CVE feed without probing it, which is how targets get shortlisted for mass exploitation after a new advisory lands.
What to do
Suppress version tokens in server banners (for example `ServerTokens Prod` in Apache) and keep the packages current.
asset: 209.17.116.163
qa.xtendhealthcare.net appears in Certificate Transparency logs. Names like this usually front staging, admin, or internal tooling, which tends to be patched later and monitored less than production.
What to do
Confirm this host is meant to be public. If not, put it behind SSO or an allow-list.
asset: qa.xtendhealthcare.net
www.qa.xtendhealthcare.net appears in Certificate Transparency logs. Names like this usually front staging, admin, or internal tooling, which tends to be patched later and monitored less than production.
What to do
Confirm this host is meant to be public. If not, put it behind SSO or an allow-list.
asset: www.qa.xtendhealthcare.net
staging.eppc.xtendhealthcare.net appears in Certificate Transparency logs. Names like this usually front staging, admin, or internal tooling, which tends to be patched later and monitored less than production.
What to do
Confirm this host is meant to be public. If not, put it behind SSO or an allow-list.
asset: staging.eppc.xtendhealthcare.net
staging.portal.xtendhealthcare.net appears in Certificate Transparency logs. Names like this usually front staging, admin, or internal tooling, which tends to be patched later and monitored less than production.
What to do
Confirm this host is meant to be public. If not, put it behind SSO or an allow-list.
asset: staging.portal.xtendhealthcare.net
staging.tntesting.xtendhealthcare.net appears in Certificate Transparency logs. Names like this usually front staging, admin, or internal tooling, which tends to be patched later and monitored less than production.
What to do
Confirm this host is meant to be public. If not, put it behind SSO or an allow-list.
asset: staging.tntesting.xtendhealthcare.net
www.staging.portal.xtendhealthcare.net appears in Certificate Transparency logs. Names like this usually front staging, admin, or internal tooling, which tends to be patched later and monitored less than production.
What to do
Confirm this host is meant to be public. If not, put it behind SSO or an allow-list.
asset: www.staging.portal.xtendhealthcare.net
www.staging.tntesting.xtendhealthcare.net appears in Certificate Transparency logs. Names like this usually front staging, admin, or internal tooling, which tends to be patched later and monitored less than production.
What to do
Confirm this host is meant to be public. If not, put it behind SSO or an allow-list.
asset: www.staging.tntesting.xtendhealthcare.net
Lets browsers guess content types, which turns some upload and text endpoints into script injection points.
What to do
Send `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` on every response.
asset: https://xtendhealthcare.net/
Answers for this domain are not signed, so a resolver cannot tell a forged response from a real one.
What to do
Enable DNSSEC at your DNS host and publish the DS record at the registrar.
asset: xtendhealthcare.net
Mail to this domain can be downgraded to plaintext by an on-path attacker, because senders have no way to know TLS is required.
What to do
Publish an MTA-STS policy (a TXT record plus a small HTTPS-hosted file).
asset: xtendhealthcare.net
Any public certificate authority may issue certificates for this domain. CAA lets you name the ones allowed to.
What to do
Add a CAA record naming your CA, e.g. `0 issue "letsencrypt.org"`.
asset: xtendhealthcare.net

final https://xtendhealthcare.net/status 526time 739msstack cloudflare

✓http:// redirects to https://
✗Strict-Transport-Security
✗Content-Security-Policy
✓Clickjacking protection
SAMEORIGIN
✗X-Content-Type-Options
✓Referrer-Policy
same-origin
–Permissions-Policyoptional
–security.txt publishedoptional — tells researchers where to report bugs

✓Receives mail via 2 servers
usb-smtp-inbound-1.mimecast.com usb-smtp-inbound-2.mimecast.com
✓SPFends in -all
v=spf1 include:spf.protection.outlook.com -all
✓DMARCp=quarantine
v=DMARC1; p=quarantine;
!MTA-STSinbound mail can be downgraded to plaintext

!DNSSECanswers can be forged
–CAAany CA may issue
–IPv6 (AAAA)IPv4 only
✓2 nameservers
ns1.dnsbycomodo.net ns2.dnsbycomodo.net

✓Registered with Network Solutions, LLC17.0 years old
xtendhealthcare.net
✓Registration expiry728 days
2028-09-04
✗Transfer lock
none
✓2 nameservers at registry
ns1.dnsbycomodo.net ns2.dnsbycomodo.net

Address	Ports	Edge	Network
209.17.116.163 xtendhealthcare.net +12	80443	direct	—
167.104.17.244 staging.eppc.xtendhealthcare.net	none known	direct	—
167.104.16.38 staging.portal.xtendhealthcare.net	none known	direct	—
167.104.17.30 staging.tntesting.xtendhealthcare.net	none known	direct	—
167.104.0.37 portal.xtendhealthcare.net	none known	direct	—
216.248.9.166 mobile.xtendhealthcare.net +1	none known	direct	—
66.18.102.20 mdm.xtendhealthcare.net	none known	direct	—

Archived URLs

Endpoints the Wayback Machine has kept — config files, backups, scripts. Slow to fetch, so it is here on request.

xtendhealthcare.net security report

Moderate

Findings

Security headers

Email authentication

DNS

Registration

Hosts

Hostnames