snhj.net security report

Certificate, security headers, email authentication, DNS, registration, and exposed hosts — from public sources.

92risk

Critical

Exposed services or known CVEs need attention now.

1Critical

7High

6Medium

2Low

2Info

Collected 14 hours ago1.5sfrom cache

Certificate Transparency2
DNS resolution2
Network ownership0
CDN / WAF detection0
Exposed ports & CVEs14
Registration
DNS posture2
Email authentication1
Certificate
Security headers2
Archived URLs
Analysis18

noteCertificate inspection is unavailable in this runtime.
noteNetwork ownership lookup is unavailable in this runtime; ASN and org are omitted.
noteCDN/WAF detection is unavailable in this runtime.

Public SMB is the vector behind WannaCry and EternalBlue.
What to do
Restrict 445/tcp to a VPN, bastion, or allow-listed source range.
asset: 43.129.68.31:445
Shodan matched this CVE against the service banners it saw on 43.129.68.31 (snhj.net), which advertise internet information services 8.5, sql server 10.50.4000.0, openssh for_Windows_9.5. These are version-fingerprint matches, not confirmed exploits: a distribution may have back-ported the fix while leaving the banner unchanged. Severity reflects the volume of known issues associated with this host, not a CVSS score. CVE-2014-4078
What to do
Confirm the running versions on 43.129.68.31 and compare them against the current security release for each package before treating any single CVE as live.
CVE-2014-4078 ↗
asset: 43.129.68.31
Windows RPC exposed publicly is a well-known lateral-movement entry point.
What to do
Restrict 135/tcp to a VPN, bastion, or allow-listed source range.
asset: 43.129.68.31:135
SMB/NetBIOS should never be reachable from the internet.
What to do
Restrict 139/tcp to a VPN, bastion, or allow-listed source range.
asset: 43.129.68.31:139
Database engines should sit behind a private network.
What to do
Restrict 3306/tcp to a VPN, bastion, or allow-listed source range.
asset: 43.129.68.31:3306
Public RDP is the most common ransomware entry point.
What to do
Restrict 3389/tcp to a VPN, bastion, or allow-listed source range.
asset: 43.129.68.31:3389
A visitor who types the address without https, or follows an old link, gets the unencrypted site. On public Wi-Fi that page can be read and rewritten in transit.
What to do
Redirect every http:// request to https:// with a 301, then add HSTS.
asset: https://snhj.net/
SPF and DKIM alone do not protect the From: address a person sees. Without DMARC, a spoofed message can pass SPF for some other domain and still display yours.
What to do
Publish `_dmarc.snhj.net TXT "v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc@snhj.net"`, review the reports, then move to p=quarantine and p=reject.
asset: snhj.net
43.129.68.31 (snhj.net) reports internet information services 8.5, sql server 10.50.4000.0, openssh for_Windows_9.5. Publishing precise versions lets anyone match the host against a CVE feed without probing it, which is how targets get shortlisted for mass exploitation after a new advisory lands.
What to do
Suppress version tokens in server banners (for example `ServerTokens Prod` in Apache) and keep the packages current.
asset: 43.129.68.31
FTP transmits credentials in cleartext.
What to do
Restrict 21/tcp to a VPN, bastion, or allow-listed source range.
asset: 43.129.68.31:21
Public SSH invites credential stuffing and key brute force.
What to do
Restrict 22/tcp to a VPN, bastion, or allow-listed source range.
asset: 43.129.68.31:22
Without HSTS the browser will still try http:// first on a fresh visit, which is the window an on-path attacker uses.
What to do
Send `Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains` once you are sure everything works over HTTPS.
asset: https://snhj.net/
CSP is the main defence that limits what an injected script can do. Without it, any XSS bug is fully exploitable.
What to do
Start with a report-only policy, tighten it against the reports, then enforce.
asset: https://snhj.net/
Without clientTransferProhibited, a compromised registrar account can move the domain to another registrar in days, with no second step.
What to do
Enable the transfer lock (and registrar lock, if offered) in the registrar control panel.
asset: snhj.net
Lets browsers guess content types, which turns some upload and text endpoints into script injection points.
What to do
Send `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` on every response.
asset: https://snhj.net/
Answers for this domain are not signed, so a resolver cannot tell a forged response from a real one.
What to do
Enable DNSSEC at your DNS host and publish the DS record at the registrar.
asset: snhj.net
Mail to this domain can be downgraded to plaintext by an on-path attacker, because senders have no way to know TLS is required.
What to do
Publish an MTA-STS policy (a TXT record plus a small HTTPS-hosted file).
asset: snhj.net
Any public certificate authority may issue certificates for this domain. CAA lets you name the ones allowed to.
What to do
Add a CAA record naming your CA, e.g. `0 issue "letsencrypt.org"`.
asset: snhj.net

final https://snhj.net/status 526time 228msstack cloudflare

✗http:// redirects to https://
✗Strict-Transport-Security
✗Content-Security-Policy
✓Clickjacking protection
SAMEORIGIN
✗X-Content-Type-Options
✓Referrer-Policy
same-origin
–Permissions-Policyoptional
–security.txt publishedoptional — tells researchers where to report bugs

✓Receives mail via 2 servers
mxn.mxhichina.com mxw.mxhichina.com
✓SPFends in -all
v=spf1 include:spf.mxhichina.com -all
✗DMARC
no record
!MTA-STSinbound mail can be downgraded to plaintext

!DNSSECanswers can be forged
–CAAany CA may issue
–IPv6 (AAAA)IPv4 only
✓2 nameservers
dns15.hichina.com dns16.hichina.com

✓Registered with Alibaba Cloud Computing (Beijing) Co., Ltd.16.4 years old
snhj.net
✓Registration expiry240 days
2027-05-05
✗Transfer lock
none
✓2 nameservers at registry
dns15.hichina.com dns16.hichina.com

Address	Ports	CVEs	Edge	Network
43.129.68.31 snhj.net +1	212280135137139445888+6	1	direct	—

Archived URLs

Endpoints the Wayback Machine has kept — config files, backups, scripts. Slow to fetch, so it is here on request.

snhj.net security report

Critical

Findings

Security headers

Email authentication

DNS

Registration

Hosts

Hostnames