k12.sd.us security report

Certificate, security headers, email authentication, DNS, registration, and exposed hosts — from public sources.

40risk

Moderate

Some surface to tighten, nothing urgent.

0Critical

0High

3Medium

17Low

2Info

Collected 8 hours ago18.3sfrom cache

Certificate Transparency299
DNS resolution28
Network ownership0
CDN / WAF detection0
Exposed ports & CVEs28
Registration
DNS posture2
Email authentication2
Certificate
Security headers1
Archived URLs
Analysis22

noteFound 299 hostnames; this runtime allows 50 outbound requests per scan, so the 21 most likely to matter were resolved.
noteCertificate inspection is unavailable in this runtime.
noteNetwork ownership lookup is unavailable in this runtime; ASN and org are omitted.
noteCDN/WAF detection is unavailable in this runtime.
noteNo registration data: RDAP has no record at this level.
note2 hosts were identified as CDN/edge infrastructure from ASN ownership rather than a cdncheck fingerprint.

CSP is the main defence that limits what an injected script can do. Without it, any XSS bug is fully exploitable.
What to do
Start with a report-only policy, tighten it against the reports, then enforce.
asset: https://k12.sd.us/
No X-Frame-Options or CSP frame-ancestors directive, so another site can load this page invisibly inside its own and trick users into clicking.
What to do
Send `X-Frame-Options: DENY` or `Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors ’none’`.
asset: https://k12.sd.us/
Receivers are asked to report spoofing but not to block it. This is the right first step, and the wrong place to stop.
What to do
Once reports look clean, move to p=quarantine, then p=reject.
asset: k12.sd.us
admin.ysd.k12.sd.us appears in Certificate Transparency logs. Names like this usually front staging, admin, or internal tooling, which tends to be patched later and monitored less than production.
What to do
Confirm this host is meant to be public. If not, put it behind SSO or an allow-list.
asset: admin.ysd.k12.sd.us
admin.smee.k12.sd.us appears in Certificate Transparency logs. Names like this usually front staging, admin, or internal tooling, which tends to be patched later and monitored less than production.
What to do
Confirm this host is meant to be public. If not, put it behind SSO or an allow-list.
asset: admin.smee.k12.sd.us
admin.be.ysd.k12.sd.us appears in Certificate Transparency logs. Names like this usually front staging, admin, or internal tooling, which tends to be patched later and monitored less than production.
What to do
Confirm this host is meant to be public. If not, put it behind SSO or an allow-list.
asset: admin.be.ysd.k12.sd.us
admin.li.ysd.k12.sd.us appears in Certificate Transparency logs. Names like this usually front staging, admin, or internal tooling, which tends to be patched later and monitored less than production.
What to do
Confirm this host is meant to be public. If not, put it behind SSO or an allow-list.
asset: admin.li.ysd.k12.sd.us
admin.st.ysd.k12.sd.us appears in Certificate Transparency logs. Names like this usually front staging, admin, or internal tooling, which tends to be patched later and monitored less than production.
What to do
Confirm this host is meant to be public. If not, put it behind SSO or an allow-list.
asset: admin.st.ysd.k12.sd.us
admin.we.ysd.k12.sd.us appears in Certificate Transparency logs. Names like this usually front staging, admin, or internal tooling, which tends to be patched later and monitored less than production.
What to do
Confirm this host is meant to be public. If not, put it behind SSO or an allow-list.
asset: admin.we.ysd.k12.sd.us
admin.yhs.ysd.k12.sd.us appears in Certificate Transparency logs. Names like this usually front staging, admin, or internal tooling, which tends to be patched later and monitored less than production.
What to do
Confirm this host is meant to be public. If not, put it behind SSO or an allow-list.
asset: admin.yhs.ysd.k12.sd.us
admin.yms.ysd.k12.sd.us appears in Certificate Transparency logs. Names like this usually front staging, admin, or internal tooling, which tends to be patched later and monitored less than production.
What to do
Confirm this host is meant to be public. If not, put it behind SSO or an allow-list.
asset: admin.yms.ysd.k12.sd.us
admin.hillcity.k12.sd.us appears in Certificate Transparency logs. Names like this usually front staging, admin, or internal tooling, which tends to be patched later and monitored less than production.
What to do
Confirm this host is meant to be public. If not, put it behind SSO or an allow-list.
asset: admin.hillcity.k12.sd.us
admin.es.hillcity.k12.sd.us appears in Certificate Transparency logs. Names like this usually front staging, admin, or internal tooling, which tends to be patched later and monitored less than production.
What to do
Confirm this host is meant to be public. If not, put it behind SSO or an allow-list.
asset: admin.es.hillcity.k12.sd.us
admin.hs.hillcity.k12.sd.us appears in Certificate Transparency logs. Names like this usually front staging, admin, or internal tooling, which tends to be patched later and monitored less than production.
What to do
Confirm this host is meant to be public. If not, put it behind SSO or an allow-list.
asset: admin.hs.hillcity.k12.sd.us
admin.ms.hillcity.k12.sd.us appears in Certificate Transparency logs. Names like this usually front staging, admin, or internal tooling, which tends to be patched later and monitored less than production.
What to do
Confirm this host is meant to be public. If not, put it behind SSO or an allow-list.
asset: admin.ms.hillcity.k12.sd.us
admin.mobridge-pollock.k12.sd.us appears in Certificate Transparency logs. Names like this usually front staging, admin, or internal tooling, which tends to be patched later and monitored less than production.
What to do
Confirm this host is meant to be public. If not, put it behind SSO or an allow-list.
asset: admin.mobridge-pollock.k12.sd.us
Browsers and the preload list expect at least six months; shorter values give little protection between visits.
What to do
Raise max-age to 31536000 (one year).
asset: https://k12.sd.us/
Lets browsers guess content types, which turns some upload and text endpoints into script injection points.
What to do
Send `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` on every response.
asset: https://k12.sd.us/
Full URLs — including any tokens or IDs in them — are sent to every third party the page links to.
What to do
Send `Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin`.
asset: https://k12.sd.us/
Answers for this domain are not signed, so a resolver cannot tell a forged response from a real one.
What to do
Enable DNSSEC at your DNS host and publish the DS record at the registrar.
asset: k12.sd.us
Mail to this domain can be downgraded to plaintext by an on-path attacker, because senders have no way to know TLS is required.
What to do
Publish an MTA-STS policy (a TXT record plus a small HTTPS-hosted file).
asset: k12.sd.us
Any public certificate authority may issue certificates for this domain. CAA lets you name the ones allowed to.
What to do
Add a CAA record naming your CA, e.g. `0 issue "letsencrypt.org"`.
asset: k12.sd.us

final https://k12.sd.us/status 200time 1407msstack cloudflare

✓http:// redirects to https://
!Strict-Transport-Security
max-age=3600
✗Content-Security-Policy
✗Clickjacking protection
✗X-Content-Type-Options
✗Referrer-Policy
–Permissions-Policyoptional
–security.txt publishedoptional — tells researchers where to report bugs

✓Receives mail via 2 servers
smtp.sd.gov smtpb.sd.gov
!SPFends in ~all
v=spf1 ip4:206.176.52.0/23 ip4:206.176.51.0/24 ip4:97.65.91.0/24 ip4:207.250.170.0/26 ip4:207.250.245.64/26 include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:_spf.bbnotify.net ~all
!DMARCp=none
v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarcreports@k12.sd.us; ruf=mailto:dmarcreports@k12.sd.us;
!MTA-STSinbound mail can be downgraded to plaintext

!DNSSECanswers can be forged
–CAAany CA may issue
–IPv6 (AAAA)IPv4 only
✓2 nameservers
ns1.k12.sd.us ns2.k12.sd.us

Address	Ports	Edge	Network
104.16.44.42 admin.ysd.k12.sd.us +17	80443205220532082208320862087+5	Cloudflare~	—
104.16.43.42 admin.ysd.k12.sd.us +17	80443205220532082208320862087+5	Cloudflare~	—
206.176.53.70 www.k12.sd.us +1	80443	direct	—

Archived URLs

Endpoints the Wayback Machine has kept — config files, backups, scripts. Slow to fetch, so it is here on request.

k12.sd.us security report

Moderate

Findings

Security headers

Email authentication

DNS

Hosts

Hostnames