johnofgod-brazil.com security report

Certificate, security headers, email authentication, DNS, registration, and exposed hosts — from public sources.

45risk

Moderate

Some surface to tighten, nothing urgent.

0Critical

0High

4Medium

6Low

2Info

Collected 15 hours ago33.1sfrom cache

Certificate Transparency3
DNS resolution2
Network ownership0
CDN / WAF detection0
Exposed ports & CVEs8
Registration
DNS posture4
Email authentication2
Certificate
Security headers0
Archived URLs
Analysis12

noteCertificate inspection is unavailable in this runtime.
noteNetwork ownership lookup is unavailable in this runtime; ASN and org are omitted.
noteCDN/WAF detection is unavailable in this runtime.

Without HSTS the browser will still try http:// first on a fresh visit, which is the window an on-path attacker uses.
What to do
Send `Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains` once you are sure everything works over HTTPS.
asset: https://johnofgod-brazil.com/
CSP is the main defence that limits what an injected script can do. Without it, any XSS bug is fully exploitable.
What to do
Start with a report-only policy, tighten it against the reports, then enforce.
asset: https://johnofgod-brazil.com/
No X-Frame-Options or CSP frame-ancestors directive, so another site can load this page invisibly inside its own and trick users into clicking.
What to do
Send `X-Frame-Options: DENY` or `Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors ’none’`.
asset: https://johnofgod-brazil.com/
Receivers are asked to report spoofing but not to block it. This is the right first step, and the wrong place to stop.
What to do
Once reports look clean, move to p=quarantine, then p=reject.
asset: johnofgod-brazil.com
62.182.19.230 (johnofgod-brazil.com) reports lua-nginx-module 1.31.1.1, openresty 1.31.1.1. Publishing precise versions lets anyone match the host against a CVE feed without probing it, which is how targets get shortlisted for mass exploitation after a new advisory lands.
What to do
Suppress version tokens in server banners (for example `ServerTokens Prod` in Apache) and keep the packages current.
asset: 62.182.19.230
Lets browsers guess content types, which turns some upload and text endpoints into script injection points.
What to do
Send `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` on every response.
asset: https://johnofgod-brazil.com/
Full URLs — including any tokens or IDs in them — are sent to every third party the page links to.
What to do
Send `Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin`.
asset: https://johnofgod-brazil.com/
Without HttpOnly, any injected script can read and exfiltrate this cookie.
What to do
Add `HttpOnly` unless client-side code genuinely needs to read it.
asset: https://johnofgod-brazil.com/
Without HttpOnly, any injected script can read and exfiltrate this cookie.
What to do
Add `HttpOnly` unless client-side code genuinely needs to read it.
asset: https://johnofgod-brazil.com/
Answers for this domain are not signed, so a resolver cannot tell a forged response from a real one.
What to do
Enable DNSSEC at your DNS host and publish the DS record at the registrar.
asset: johnofgod-brazil.com
Mail to this domain can be downgraded to plaintext by an on-path attacker, because senders have no way to know TLS is required.
What to do
Publish an MTA-STS policy (a TXT record plus a small HTTPS-hosted file).
asset: johnofgod-brazil.com
Any public certificate authority may issue certificates for this domain. CAA lets you name the ones allowed to.
What to do
Add a CAA record naming your CA, e.g. `0 issue "letsencrypt.org"`.
asset: johnofgod-brazil.com

final https://johnofgod-brazil.com/status 200time 1470msstack cloudflare

✓http:// redirects to https://
✗Strict-Transport-Security
✗Content-Security-Policy
✗Clickjacking protection
✗X-Content-Type-Options
✗Referrer-Policy
–Permissions-Policyoptional
–security.txt publishedoptional — tells researchers where to report bugs

!Cookie jssCart
Secure · no HttpOnly · no SameSite
!Cookie jssHash
Secure · no HttpOnly · no SameSite

✓Receives mail via 3 servers
failover1.email-cluster.com mx1.email-cluster.com mx2.email-cluster.com
!SPFends in ~all
v=spf1 a mx ip4:62.182.19.230 include:_spf.google.com ~all
!DMARCp=none
v=DMARC1; p=none;
!MTA-STSinbound mail can be downgraded to plaintext

!DNSSECanswers can be forged
–CAAany CA may issue
–IPv6 (AAAA)IPv4 only
✓4 nameservers
ns1124.ui-dns.biz ns1124.ui-dns.com ns1124.ui-dns.de ns1124.ui-dns.org

✓Registered with IONOS SE19.3 years old
johnofgod-brazil.com
✓Registration expiry273 days
2027-06-06
✓Transfer lock
client transfer prohibited
✓4 nameservers at registry
ns1124.ui-dns.biz ns1124.ui-dns.com ns1124.ui-dns.de ns1124.ui-dns.org

Address	Ports	CVEs	Edge	Network
62.182.19.230 johnofgod-brazil.com +6	8011044320792082208320862087	0	direct	—

Archived URLs

Endpoints the Wayback Machine has kept — config files, backups, scripts. Slow to fetch, so it is here on request.

johnofgod-brazil.com security report

Moderate

Findings

Security headers

Email authentication

DNS

Registration

Hosts

Hostnames