indian-tv.cz security report

Certificate, security headers, email authentication, DNS, registration, and exposed hosts — from public sources.

34risk

Moderate

Some surface to tighten, nothing urgent.

0Critical

0High

3Medium

3Low

1Info

Collected 11 hours ago4.3sfrom cache

Certificate Transparency1
DNS resolution2
Network ownership0
CDN / WAF detection0
Exposed ports & CVEs26
Registration
DNS posture2
Email authentication2
Certificate
Security headers1
Archived URLs
Analysis7

noteCertificate inspection is unavailable in this runtime.
noteNetwork ownership lookup is unavailable in this runtime; ASN and org are omitted.
noteCDN/WAF detection is unavailable in this runtime.
note2 hosts were identified as CDN/edge infrastructure from ASN ownership rather than a cdncheck fingerprint.

Without HSTS the browser will still try http:// first on a fresh visit, which is the window an on-path attacker uses.
What to do
Send `Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains` once you are sure everything works over HTTPS.
asset: https://indian-tv.cz/
CSP is the main defence that limits what an injected script can do. Without it, any XSS bug is fully exploitable.
What to do
Start with a report-only policy, tighten it against the reports, then enforce.
asset: https://indian-tv.cz/
Without clientTransferProhibited, a compromised registrar account can move the domain to another registrar in days, with no second step.
What to do
Enable the transfer lock (and registrar lock, if offered) in the registrar control panel.
asset: indian-tv.cz
Lets browsers guess content types, which turns some upload and text endpoints into script injection points.
What to do
Send `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` on every response.
asset: https://indian-tv.cz/
Full URLs — including any tokens or IDs in them — are sent to every third party the page links to.
What to do
Send `Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin`.
asset: https://indian-tv.cz/
Answers for this domain are not signed, so a resolver cannot tell a forged response from a real one.
What to do
Enable DNSSEC at your DNS host and publish the DS record at the registrar.
asset: indian-tv.cz
Mail to this domain can be downgraded to plaintext by an on-path attacker, because senders have no way to know TLS is required.
What to do
Publish an MTA-STS policy (a TXT record plus a small HTTPS-hosted file).
asset: indian-tv.cz

final https://indian-tv.cz/status 200time 105msstack cloudflare · INDIAN

✓http:// redirects to https://
✗Strict-Transport-Security
✗Content-Security-Policy
✓Clickjacking protection
DENY
✗X-Content-Type-Options
✗Referrer-Policy
–Permissions-Policyoptional
✓security.txt published

✓Receives mail via 1 server
mail.fiolasoft.net
!SPFends in ~all
v=spf1 mx a:mail.fiolasoft.net ip4:167.172.100.144 include:mailgun.org ~all
✓DMARCp=reject
v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject; rua=mailto:indiantvcz-d@dmarc.report-uri.com; ruf=mailto:postmaster@indian-tv.cz; rf=afrf; pct=100; ri=86400
!MTA-STSinbound mail can be downgraded to plaintext

!DNSSECanswers can be forged
✓CAA
0 issue "comodoca.com" · 0 issue "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes" · 0 issue "letsencrypt.org" · 0 issue "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes" · 0 issue "ssl.com" · 0 issuewild "comodoca.com" · 0 issuewild "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes" · 0 issuewild "letsencrypt.org" · 0 issuewild "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes" · 0 issuewild "ssl.com"
✓IPv6 (AAAA)
✓2 nameservers
angela.ns.cloudflare.com sid.ns.cloudflare.com

✓Registered17.4 years old
indian-tv.cz
✓Registration expiry2037 days
2032-04-05
✗Transfer lock
none
✓2 nameservers at registry
angela.ns.cloudflare.com sid.ns.cloudflare.com

Address	Ports	CVEs	Edge	Network
172.67.223.195 indian-tv.cz +1	80443205220532082208320862087+5	0	Cloudflare~	—
104.21.78.164 indian-tv.cz	80443205220532082208320862087+5	0	Cloudflare~	—

Archived URLs

Endpoints the Wayback Machine has kept — config files, backups, scripts. Slow to fetch, so it is here on request.

indian-tv.cz security report

Moderate

Findings

Security headers

Email authentication

DNS

Registration

Hosts

Hostnames