imagetotext.io security report

Certificate, security headers, email authentication, DNS, registration, and exposed hosts — from public sources.

38risk

Moderate

Some surface to tighten, nothing urgent.

0Critical

0High

3Medium

6Low

2Info

Collected 17 hours ago4.9sfrom cache

Certificate Transparency5
DNS resolution9
Network ownership0
CDN / WAF detection0
Exposed ports & CVEs39
Registration
DNS posture2
Email authentication2
Certificate
Security headers0
Archived URLs
Analysis11

noteCertificate inspection is unavailable in this runtime.
noteNetwork ownership lookup is unavailable in this runtime; ASN and org are omitted.
noteCDN/WAF detection is unavailable in this runtime.
noteNo registration data: RDAP has no record at this level.
note3 hosts were identified as CDN/edge infrastructure from ASN ownership rather than a cdncheck fingerprint.

Without HSTS the browser will still try http:// first on a fresh visit, which is the window an on-path attacker uses.
What to do
Send `Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains` once you are sure everything works over HTTPS.
asset: https://www.imagetotext.io/
CSP is the main defence that limits what an injected script can do. Without it, any XSS bug is fully exploitable.
What to do
Start with a report-only policy, tighten it against the reports, then enforce.
asset: https://www.imagetotext.io/
No X-Frame-Options or CSP frame-ancestors directive, so another site can load this page invisibly inside its own and trick users into clicking.
What to do
Send `X-Frame-Options: DENY` or `Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors ’none’`.
asset: https://www.imagetotext.io/
staging.imagetotext.io appears in Certificate Transparency logs. Names like this usually front staging, admin, or internal tooling, which tends to be patched later and monitored less than production.
What to do
Confirm this host is meant to be public. If not, put it behind SSO or an allow-list.
asset: staging.imagetotext.io
staging-2.imagetotext.io appears in Certificate Transparency logs. Names like this usually front staging, admin, or internal tooling, which tends to be patched later and monitored less than production.
What to do
Confirm this host is meant to be public. If not, put it behind SSO or an allow-list.
asset: staging-2.imagetotext.io
Lets browsers guess content types, which turns some upload and text endpoints into script injection points.
What to do
Send `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` on every response.
asset: https://www.imagetotext.io/
Full URLs — including any tokens or IDs in them — are sent to every third party the page links to.
What to do
Send `Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin`.
asset: https://www.imagetotext.io/
Without HttpOnly, any injected script can read and exfiltrate this cookie.
What to do
Add `HttpOnly` unless client-side code genuinely needs to read it.
asset: https://www.imagetotext.io/
Answers for this domain are not signed, so a resolver cannot tell a forged response from a real one.
What to do
Enable DNSSEC at your DNS host and publish the DS record at the registrar.
asset: imagetotext.io
Mail to this domain can be downgraded to plaintext by an on-path attacker, because senders have no way to know TLS is required.
What to do
Publish an MTA-STS policy (a TXT record plus a small HTTPS-hosted file).
asset: imagetotext.io
Any public certificate authority may issue certificates for this domain. CAA lets you name the ones allowed to.
What to do
Add a CAA record naming your CA, e.g. `0 issue "letsencrypt.org"`.
asset: imagetotext.io

final https://www.imagetotext.io/status 200time 348msstack cloudflare

✓http:// redirects to https://
✗Strict-Transport-Security
✗Content-Security-Policy
✗Clickjacking protection
✗X-Content-Type-Options
✗Referrer-Policy
–Permissions-Policyoptional
–security.txt publishedoptional — tells researchers where to report bugs

!Cookie XSRF-TOKEN
Secure · no HttpOnly · SameSite=lax
✓Cookie imagetotextio_session
Secure · HttpOnly · SameSite=lax

✓Receives mail via 5 servers
alt1.aspmx.l.google.com alt2.aspmx.l.google.com alt3.aspmx.l.google.com alt4.aspmx.l.google.com+1
!SPFends in ~all
v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all
✓DMARCp=reject
v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject; adkim=s; aspf=s;
!MTA-STSinbound mail can be downgraded to plaintext

!DNSSECanswers can be forged
–CAAany CA may issue
✓IPv6 (AAAA)
✓2 nameservers
dave.ns.cloudflare.com kristin.ns.cloudflare.com

Address	Ports	Edge	Network
104.26.14.144 imagetotext.io +4	80443205220532082208320862087+5	Cloudflare~	—
104.26.15.144 imagetotext.io +4	80443205220532082208320862087+5	Cloudflare~	—
172.67.70.10 imagetotext.io +3	80443205220532082208320862087+5	Cloudflare~	—

Archived URLs

Endpoints the Wayback Machine has kept — config files, backups, scripts. Slow to fetch, so it is here on request.

imagetotext.io security report

Moderate

Findings

Security headers

Email authentication

DNS

Hosts

Hostnames