gns.cri.nz security report

Certificate, security headers, email authentication, DNS, registration, and exposed hosts — from public sources.

89risk

Critical

Exposed services or known CVEs need attention now.

2Critical

8High

9Medium

16Low

2Info

Collected 3 hours ago23.0sfrom cache

Certificate Transparency49
DNS resolution41
Network ownership0
CDN / WAF detection0
Exposed ports & CVEs542
Registration
DNS posture4
Email authentication2
Certificate
Security headers0
Archived URLs
Analysis37

noteFound 49 hostnames; this runtime allows 50 outbound requests per scan, so the 21 most likely to matter were resolved.
noteFound 34 addresses; enriching the first 12.
noteCertificate inspection is unavailable in this runtime.
noteNetwork ownership lookup is unavailable in this runtime; ASN and org are omitted.
noteCDN/WAF detection is unavailable in this runtime.
noteNo registration data: RDAP has no record at this level.

An unauthenticated Docker socket is root on the host.
What to do
Restrict 2375/tcp to a VPN, bastion, or allow-listed source range.
asset: 45.60.15.134:2375
Open Elasticsearch is the classic source of mass data leaks.
What to do
Restrict 9200/tcp to a VPN, bastion, or allow-listed source range.
asset: 45.60.15.134:9200
Windows RPC exposed publicly is a well-known lateral-movement entry point.
What to do
Restrict 135/tcp to a VPN, bastion, or allow-listed source range.
asset: 45.60.15.134:135
Database engines should sit behind a private network.
What to do
Restrict 1433/tcp to a VPN, bastion, or allow-listed source range.
asset: 45.60.15.134:1433
Database engines should sit behind a private network.
What to do
Restrict 1521/tcp to a VPN, bastion, or allow-listed source range.
asset: 45.60.15.134:1521
Remote Docker control should not be internet-facing.
What to do
Restrict 2376/tcp to a VPN, bastion, or allow-listed source range.
asset: 45.60.15.134:2376
Database engines should sit behind a private network.
What to do
Restrict 3306/tcp to a VPN, bastion, or allow-listed source range.
asset: 45.60.15.134:3306
Public RDP is the most common ransomware entry point.
What to do
Restrict 3389/tcp to a VPN, bastion, or allow-listed source range.
asset: 45.60.15.134:3389
Kibana often ships with no authentication and reads the whole cluster.
What to do
Restrict 5601/tcp to a VPN, bastion, or allow-listed source range.
asset: 45.60.15.134:5601
VNC frequently runs with weak or absent authentication.
What to do
Restrict 5900/tcp to a VPN, bastion, or allow-listed source range.
asset: 45.60.15.134:5900
FTP transmits credentials in cleartext.
What to do
Restrict 21/tcp to a VPN, bastion, or allow-listed source range.
asset: 45.60.15.134:21
Commonly a leftover listener or an implant default port.
What to do
Restrict 4444/tcp to a VPN, bastion, or allow-listed source range.
asset: 45.60.15.134:4444
Time-series data is often exposed without authentication.
What to do
Restrict 8086/tcp to a VPN, bastion, or allow-listed source range.
asset: 45.60.15.134:8086
Without HSTS the browser will still try http:// first on a fresh visit, which is the window an on-path attacker uses.
What to do
Send `Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains` once you are sure everything works over HTTPS.
asset: https://gns.cri.nz/
CSP is the main defence that limits what an injected script can do. Without it, any XSS bug is fully exploitable.
What to do
Start with a report-only policy, tighten it against the reports, then enforce.
asset: https://gns.cri.nz/
No X-Frame-Options or CSP frame-ancestors directive, so another site can load this page invisibly inside its own and trick users into clicking.
What to do
Send `X-Frame-Options: DENY` or `Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors ’none’`.
asset: https://gns.cri.nz/
The browser will also send this cookie over plain http://, where it can be captured.
What to do
Add `Secure` to the cookie.
asset: https://gns.cri.nz/
The browser will also send this cookie over plain http://, where it can be captured.
What to do
Add `Secure` to the cookie.
asset: https://gns.cri.nz/
Receivers are asked to report spoofing but not to block it. This is the right first step, and the wrong place to stop.
What to do
Once reports look clean, move to p=quarantine, then p=reject.
asset: gns.cri.nz
Check it is not an open relay.
What to do
Restrict 25/tcp to a VPN, bastion, or allow-listed source range.
asset: 45.60.15.134:25
uat.gns.cri.nz appears in Certificate Transparency logs. Names like this usually front staging, admin, or internal tooling, which tends to be patched later and monitored less than production.
What to do
Confirm this host is meant to be public. If not, put it behind SSO or an allow-list.
asset: uat.gns.cri.nz
nhrp.uat.gns.cri.nz appears in Certificate Transparency logs. Names like this usually front staging, admin, or internal tooling, which tends to be patched later and monitored less than production.
What to do
Confirm this host is meant to be public. If not, put it behind SSO or an allow-list.
asset: nhrp.uat.gns.cri.nz
nshm-test.gns.cri.nz appears in Certificate Transparency logs. Names like this usually front staging, admin, or internal tooling, which tends to be patched later and monitored less than production.
What to do
Confirm this host is meant to be public. If not, put it behind SSO or an allow-list.
asset: nshm-test.gns.cri.nz
weka-test.gns.cri.nz appears in Certificate Transparency logs. Names like this usually front staging, admin, or internal tooling, which tends to be patched later and monitored less than production.
What to do
Confirm this host is meant to be public. If not, put it behind SSO or an allow-list.
asset: weka-test.gns.cri.nz
kororaa-test.gns.cri.nz appears in Certificate Transparency logs. Names like this usually front staging, admin, or internal tooling, which tends to be patched later and monitored less than production.
What to do
Confirm this host is meant to be public. If not, put it behind SSO or an allow-list.
asset: kororaa-test.gns.cri.nz
nshm-api-test.gns.cri.nz appears in Certificate Transparency logs. Names like this usually front staging, admin, or internal tooling, which tends to be patched later and monitored less than production.
What to do
Confirm this host is meant to be public. If not, put it behind SSO or an allow-list.
asset: nshm-api-test.gns.cri.nz
weka-api-test.gns.cri.nz appears in Certificate Transparency logs. Names like this usually front staging, admin, or internal tooling, which tends to be patched later and monitored less than production.
What to do
Confirm this host is meant to be public. If not, put it behind SSO or an allow-list.
asset: weka-api-test.gns.cri.nz
nshm-public-apigw-test.gns.cri.nz appears in Certificate Transparency logs. Names like this usually front staging, admin, or internal tooling, which tends to be patched later and monitored less than production.
What to do
Confirm this host is meant to be public. If not, put it behind SSO or an allow-list.
asset: nshm-public-apigw-test.gns.cri.nz
nshm-kororaa-apigw-test.gns.cri.nz appears in Certificate Transparency logs. Names like this usually front staging, admin, or internal tooling, which tends to be patched later and monitored less than production.
What to do
Confirm this host is meant to be public. If not, put it behind SSO or an allow-list.
asset: nshm-kororaa-apigw-test.gns.cri.nz
nshm-static-reports-test.gns.cri.nz appears in Certificate Transparency logs. Names like this usually front staging, admin, or internal tooling, which tends to be patched later and monitored less than production.
What to do
Confirm this host is meant to be public. If not, put it behind SSO or an allow-list.
asset: nshm-static-reports-test.gns.cri.nz
corp.gns.cri.nz appears in Certificate Transparency logs. Names like this usually front staging, admin, or internal tooling, which tends to be patched later and monitored less than production.
What to do
Confirm this host is meant to be public. If not, put it behind SSO or an allow-list.
asset: corp.gns.cri.nz
Lets browsers guess content types, which turns some upload and text endpoints into script injection points.
What to do
Send `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` on every response.
asset: https://gns.cri.nz/
Full URLs — including any tokens or IDs in them — are sent to every third party the page links to.
What to do
Send `Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin`.
asset: https://gns.cri.nz/
Without HttpOnly, any injected script can read and exfiltrate this cookie.
What to do
Add `HttpOnly` unless client-side code genuinely needs to read it.
asset: https://gns.cri.nz/
Answers for this domain are not signed, so a resolver cannot tell a forged response from a real one.
What to do
Enable DNSSEC at your DNS host and publish the DS record at the registrar.
asset: gns.cri.nz
Mail to this domain can be downgraded to plaintext by an on-path attacker, because senders have no way to know TLS is required.
What to do
Publish an MTA-STS policy (a TXT record plus a small HTTPS-hosted file).
asset: gns.cri.nz
Any public certificate authority may issue certificates for this domain. CAA lets you name the ones allowed to.
What to do
Add a CAA record naming your CA, e.g. `0 issue "letsencrypt.org"`.
asset: gns.cri.nz

final https://gns.cri.nz/status 200time 822msstack cloudflare

–http:// redirects to https://port 80 did not answer
✗Strict-Transport-Security
✗Content-Security-Policy
✗Clickjacking protection
✗X-Content-Type-Options
✗Referrer-Policy
–Permissions-Policyoptional
–security.txt publishedoptional — tells researchers where to report bugs

✗Cookie visid_incap_2814351
no Secure · HttpOnly · no SameSite
✗Cookie incap_ses_1136_2814351
no Secure · no HttpOnly · no SameSite

✓Receives mail via 2 servers
mx1.securemx.biz mx2.securemx.biz
✓SPFends in -all
v=spf1 ip4:161.65.46.26 include:spf.securemx.biz include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:_spf.bigcommerce.com include:amazonses.com include:mail.zendesk.com include:4e1757.workshop-spf.net -all
!DMARCp=none
v=DMARC1; p=none; pct=100; fo=1; ri=3600; rua=mailto:dmarcreports@gns.cri.nz; ruf=mailto:dmarcreports@gns.cri.nz;
!MTA-STSinbound mail can be downgraded to plaintext

!DNSSECanswers can be forged
–CAAany CA may issue
–IPv6 (AAAA)IPv4 only
✓4 nameservers
ns1.gns.cri.nz ns2.gns.cri.nz ns2.reannz.co.nz ns6.dnsmadeeasy.com

Address	Ports	Edge	Network
45.60.15.134 www.gns.cri.nz +3	1121254353808182+517	direct	—
13.35.36.15 nshm-test.gns.cri.nz +3	80443	direct	—
13.35.36.79 nshm-test.gns.cri.nz +29	80443	direct	—
13.35.36.14 nshm-test.gns.cri.nz +3	80443	direct	—
13.35.36.53 nshm-test.gns.cri.nz +3	80443	direct	—
13.55.242.60 uat.gns.cri.nz +4	80443	direct	—
108.156.144.123 nshm-api-test.gns.cri.nz +49	80443	direct	—
99.86.18.35 weka-test.gns.cri.nz +1	80	direct	—
99.86.18.50 weka-test.gns.cri.nz +1	80	direct	—
99.86.18.117 weka-test.gns.cri.nz +1	80	direct	—
99.86.18.40 weka-test.gns.cri.nz +1	80	direct	—
52.65.162.65 uat.gns.cri.nz +2	80	direct	—

Archived URLs

Endpoints the Wayback Machine has kept — config files, backups, scripts. Slow to fetch, so it is here on request.

gns.cri.nz security report

Critical

Findings

Security headers

Email authentication

DNS

Hosts

Hostnames